America’s Puppet Masters: How the U.S. Engineered the Philippines as a Perpetual Vassal State Under Martial Law, Revolution, and Controlled Transition

America’s Puppet Masters: How the U.S. Engineered the Philippines as a Perpetual Vassal State Under Martial Law, Revolution, and Controlled Transition

In September 1972, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, citing threats from communists and Muslim separatists.

He suspended the constitution, jailed opposition leaders, imposed media censorship, and ruled by decree for over 13 years. This authoritarian grip consolidated his power while enriching his family and cronies, all with strong U.S. backing as an anti-communist bulwark in Southeast Asia.

By the late 1970s, however, cracks appeared. In January 1977, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived for a rapid 30-hour visit to Manila amid this martial law era.

His declassified cable (STATE 010198 — full text available here: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978STATE010198_d.html), revealed not a push for genuine Filipino self-determination, but a cynical strategy to manage the regime’s decline and pre-select a compliant successor.

Warren Christopher’s Visit: Spotting and Cultivating a Controlled Opposition

Warren Christopher met Marcos and his inner circle, including Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, who defended military tribunals and downplayed torture.

He also engaged opposition voices, heard harrowing accounts of detention abuses, and held a private late-evening meeting with imprisoned Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Warren Christopher described Aquino as a “compelling and charismatic” leader of the “first rank,” deeply committed to U.S.-style democratic ideals.

He even explored releasing Aquino to a Harvard fellowship and suggested sending him regular American human rights statements.

This was no humanitarian mission.

While publicly nodding to Carter-era human rights concerns, the U.S. was identifying and co-opting moderate opposition figures who would preserve American military bases, economic privileges, and geopolitical alignment. Warren Christopher recommended distancing somewhat from Marcos—opposing international loans, limiting aid, and slowing base negotiations—but the real goal was ensuring any post-martial law order remained firmly within Washington’s orbit.

From Martial Law to the 1986 People Power Revolution

Martial law dragged on, breeding corruption, debt, and resentment. The 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino upon his return from U.S. exile ignited widespread outrage.

Facing collapsing legitimacy, Marcos called a snap presidential election in February 1986. Fraud was rampant, sparking massive protests that erupted into the People Power Revolution (EDSA) from February 22–25. Hundreds of thousands of Filipinos, backed by defecting military units, the Catholic Church, and civil society, filled the streets in a largely nonviolent uprising that ended the dictatorship.

Yet the revolution was not allowed to unfold freely.

As Marcos clung to power, the U.S. stepped in decisively to manage the outcome.

The U.S.-Orchestrated Exfiltration and Installation of a New Vassal

With the regime collapsing, U.S. Senator Paul Laxalt delivered the blunt message to Marcos: “cut and cut cleanly.” On February 25, 1986, American helicopters whisked Marcos, his family, and entourage from Malacañang Palace to Clark Air Base.

From there, U.S. aircraft flew them first to Guam and then to Hawaii, where they lived in exile. This smooth exfiltration—protected by American forces—prevented chaos or loyalist backlash while shielding a longtime client from popular justice.

Simultaneously, Corazon Aquino—widow of the man Warren Christopher had vetted nearly a decade earlier—was sworn in as president.

What Filipinos celebrated as a triumphant people’s victory was, in reality, a textbook U.S.-managed transition: discard the tarnished dictator, elevate a pliable elite moderate from the pre-approved opposition, and restore the facade of democracy without disrupting core American interests.

A Century of Pre-Selected Leadership and Enduring Vassalage

This pattern was no anomaly.

Since colonial times and the conditional “independence” of 1946—with its lopsided trade deals granting Americans parity rights—the U.S. has repeatedly pre-selected or shaped Philippine leaders: from Manuel Roxas to Ramon Magsaysay (a CIA favorite), Marcos himself, the Aquinos, Fidel Ramos, and beyond.

Even shifts like Rodrigo Duterte’s brief independent streak gave way to the return of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., illustrating Washington’s enduring leverage through military aid, expanded basing agreements (EDCA, VFA), and economic pressure.

The Philippines remains a vassal state: its foreign policy locked into U.S. containment strategies, its economy burdened by debt and unequal access for American interests, and its sovereignty undermined by foreign troop presence and intervention rights.

Martial law exposed the dictatorship; the revolution showed the people’s power; but U.S. exfiltration and leadership selection ensured continuity of control.

Warren Christopher’s 1977 visit during the height of martial law laid bare the cynicism: criticize abuses when convenient, but always ensure the next leader upholds the empire’s bargain.

Filipinos have sacrificed blood, sovereignty, and true independence for this “special relationship”—one defined not by partnership, but by master and client. Until this cycle of pre-selection ends, the Philippines will never be fully free.

Full detail of Wikileak cable >

Cleaned and Reformatted Version of the Declassified US State Department Cable

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE 010198

SUBJECT: Report on 30-Hour Visit to Manila

1. SUMMARY:

I have just completed a 30-hour visit to Manila during which I saw President Marcos and several of his Cabinet members, Supreme Court Justices, Cardinal Sin, a number of prominent opposition leaders, Mrs. Herrera, and imprisoned former Senator Aquino (the latter in late evening at his place of detention).

On the basis of my discussions, I believe the USG should take a clear stance in favor of free elections and a free press and, until these goals are achieved, should give consideration to distancing ourselves to a degree from the Marcos regime. At the least, we should maintain our policy of opposing IFI loans for the Philippines and should review our aid programs with an eye to holding them strictly to basic human needs projects which avoid identification with the current government, and string out base negotiations. I fully recognize our other interests and concerns in the Philippines but believe a convincing case can be made for scaling down USG commitment to Marcos.

END SUMMARY.

2. My program began with evening and breakfast meetings with opposition figures such as former President Macapagal, leading senators from the abolished legislature, religious workers, and Mrs. Trinidad A. Herrera. All spoke with restraint and frequent eloquence about the absence of democratic processes in their country — a country, they emphasized, which learned its democratic ideals from the United States. In addition to no free elections, they particularly stressed the lack of a free press, without which efforts such as the recently-formed Philippine Organization for Human Rights — organized by former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, former President Macapagal, and former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Salvador Lopez — remain virtually unknown in the Philippines. Press and media presently function under government censorship or self-restraint, the latter resulting from concentration of control in the hands of Marcos associates. Even modest publishing efforts by church groups (e.g., Rev. James Reuter) are blocked by the regime.

3. Mrs. Herrera described the torture she received while in military detention. I believe her.

4. Much of the morning was taken up by a military briefing which turned into an informal debate on rule of law, due process, and the judiciary system under martial law. The briefing was organized by Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, the able (Harvard-trained) former Justice Secretary, who defended martial law under which civilian offenses are tried by military courts-martial. He stressed that Philippine laws are based on US military codes and cited examples from our own history of martial law during the Civil War. He waffled on torture, conceding that his 100-150,000 military force may have tortured a hundred or so (as claimed) of the 63,000 Filipinos who have been detained in the past five years (2,000 currently). The Secretary referred to the threat of Communist subversion and terrorism as reason for military rule (although the original rationale for martial law was corruption and political excesses in the early 1970s). He also said the government might have been wiser to shoot more of the prisoners who were now complaining about their treatment.

5. I also called on the feisty octogenarian Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo, who described martial law as necessary for the Philippines and not inconsistent with Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and his personal involvement in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He also claimed that the people are not yet ready for democracy, which they had tried and found too sophisticated for their level of development; that the current government was bringing about “national discipline,” including clean streets and forming queues in stores and at bus stops; that other countries are not criticizing the Philippines; and that “diplomatic relations should be based on mutual respect.”

6. Accompanied by Ambassador Newsom (who also joined me for the calls on Romulo and the Defense Secretary), I met for 90 minutes with President Marcos, together with his Secretaries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Information. Marcos spent the first half hour railing against Aquino (for reasons which became obvious when I talked to Aquino that evening — more on that below). Marcos claimed the Communist NPA has killed potential witnesses against Aquino, whom he asserted is guilty of running arms and arranging a murder, among other offenses. I gave Marcos a letter from Senator Don Riegle (D-Mich.) objecting to the death sentence on Aquino, to which Marcos said he would reply along the lines of his remarks to me. I told the President that as long as martial law continues, people doubt such assertions against a man, recognized as a political opponent, who has been held for five years without trial, much of it incommunicado.

Marcos acknowledged that “martial law has a connotation of oppression — that is the cross we have to bear. If this was India or Malaysia, Aquino would have been shot” (which I interpret as an example of psychological projection). Marcos is acutely aware that Aquino has become an international symbol and, unless there is a moment of panic, he is unlikely to have him killed. Fearing Aquino as a symbol of the opposition, however, Marcos appears also unlikely to let him out of prison in the foreseeable future.

7. I observed that many citizens welcomed martial law when it was first declared, but that people have a clock on such measures and consider the time has run out. Marcos said he recognized since 1972 that martial law would be temporary, and that he hopes to be able to end it “when the Moslem secessionist threat in Mindanao is ended.” He did not suggest a date.

8. Following lunch at Malacañang Palace (for which Mrs. Marcos put in a late appearance after her lunch with a Chinese delegation), I called on Jaime Cardinal Sin, who added his thoroughly respectable endorsement to the views I had heard from opposition leaders. Cardinal Sin said he voted “NO” in Marcos’ referendum and signed his ballot to be sure Marcos would know — “in ink” so it would not be altered. I consider him a key figure in helping move his country back to democracy.

9. The Supreme Court is more or less independent (4 members were classmates of Marcos), proud of its professionalism, and apparently troubled by martial law. The number of opinions with dissent grows. Aquino has deliberately raised a number of landmark questions to build the record and sees it as his duty to do so.

10. Following a social gathering at the Newsoms’ residence, I drove at 8:30 p.m. to the army barracks at which Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. is confined. Seeing him proved to be a moving conclusion to an already full day. We met for 90 minutes, without Philippine witnesses, during which Aquino spoke of the circumstances leading to his detention, his legal moves, and his own hopes for the future. He is a compelling and charismatic man, clearly a political leader of the first rank, with an apparently profound commitment to democratic and anti-totalitarian ideals. Seeing him at first hand makes it clear why Marcos had him jailed: he fears him as his most effective political rival and probably would like nothing more than to have Aquino disappear from the Philippines (and from this earth).

11. I asked Aquino if he would like us to ask for his release to the U.S. He is tempted by the Harvard fellowship, but having endured five years under sometimes horrendous conditions (e.g., a month of solitary in a box) he now feels a sense of commitment which for the time being compels him to stay. His wife (whom I had met at breakfast and whose heroism in this situation is equivalent to his) has accepted this decision, although she too feels the temptation to take the path offered by the Harvard fellowship.

12. I have encouraged Dave Newsom to consider visiting Aquino too as a further expression of our awareness of his plight, and to see for himself the qualities I sensed in this remarkable man. I am sending Aquino a copy of the President’s Paris speech and suggest we regularly send him such documents. Aquino said the President’s human rights statements had resulted in major improvements in his conditions. When I asked him what the U.S. might do, he referred (as so many others had) to the importance of our democratic traditions for the Philippines. He has a deep loyalty to his country and hopes to have a role in its political future. On practical matters, he thought Marcos’ current policies are governed by his need to finance his $6.5 billion debt. He also said the Philippine people want and expect our bases to remain.

13. On both these matters the obvious implication is that we should go slow to avoid giving Marcos the political gains that would result from a lucrative bases agreement or generous international financing.

14. Ambassador Newsom and his staff did a fine job of arranging for me to see so many people in such a short period. I believe we and they face difficult questions in balancing our human rights concerns with our other interests in this country. I hope we can discuss and review these questions with the help of the Embassy and concerned bureaus after my return. This country’s situation requires us to be mindful of our Greek experience. Regards.

NEWSOM